fix: valid key header bypasses both IP allowlist and PROXY_SECRET check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ PROXY_SECRET=
 # Example: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12"
 ALLOWED_CIDR=
 
-# API key header: a request carrying this header bypasses the IP allowlist (IP OR key).
+# API key header: a request carrying this header bypasses both the IP allowlist and PROXY_SECRET check.
 # Set both or neither. Name: [A-Za-z0-9-], value: [A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]. Only matters if ALLOWED_CIDR is set.
 # Generate value with: openssl rand -hex 32
 AUTH_HEADER_NAME=

README.md

@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ docker inspect --format='{{.State.Health.Status}}' api-proxy
 ## How It Works
 
 1. A k8s pod sends a request to `https://proxy.bildme.ru/elevenlabs/v1/text-to-speech/...` (or `http://<vm-ip>:8082/...`) with the `X-Proxy-Token` header and the original API key.
-2. Caddy lets the request through if the source IP is in `ALLOWED_CIDR` **or** it carries the `AUTH_HEADER_NAME: AUTH_HEADER_VALUE` header, then validates `X-Proxy-Token` (if `PROXY_SECRET` is set) — rejecting with 403 on failure. `/health` is answered before both guards.
+2. Caddy lets the request through if the source IP is in `ALLOWED_CIDR` **or** it carries the `AUTH_HEADER_NAME: AUTH_HEADER_VALUE` header, then validates `X-Proxy-Token` (if `PROXY_SECRET` is set; a valid key header satisfies this check too) — rejecting with 403 on failure. `/health` is answered before both guards.
 3. `handle_path` strips the prefix (`/elevenlabs/`, `/openai/`, `/telegram/`, `/openrouter/`, `/deepseek/`) and the request is forwarded over HTTPS with the upstream host as both `Host` header and TLS SNI.
 4. `X-Proxy-Token`, the `AUTH_HEADER_NAME` header and all IP-leaking headers (`X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Real-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `X-Client-IP`, `Forwarded`, `Via`) are removed before forwarding; API keys pass through unchanged.
 5. Responses stream back unbuffered (`flush_interval -1`) — critical for binary audio, SSE token streams and Telegram long-polling.

docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ if [ -z "${ACME_EMAIL}" ]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-# --- 1. API key header (optional bypass of the IP allowlist) ---
+# --- 1. API key header (optional: bypasses both the IP allowlist and the token check) ---
 KEY_MATCH=""
 if [ -n "${AUTH_HEADER_NAME}" ] || [ -n "${AUTH_HEADER_VALUE}" ]; then
     if [ -z "${AUTH_HEADER_NAME}" ] || [ -z "${AUTH_HEADER_VALUE}" ]; then
@@ -67,12 +67,15 @@ GUARDRULE
     echo "[entrypoint] IP allowlist configured: ${CIDR_LIST}"
 fi
 
-# --- 3. Token auth (legacy, applied in addition to the checks above) ---
+# --- 3. Token auth (legacy X-Proxy-Token; a valid key header also satisfies it) ---
 if [ -z "${PROXY_SECRET}" ]; then
     echo "[entrypoint] PROXY_SECRET is not set — token auth disabled (open mode)"
 else
     cat >> "${MATCHERS}" <<MATCH
-@bad_token not header X-Proxy-Token "${PROXY_SECRET}"
+@bad_token {
+	not header X-Proxy-Token "${PROXY_SECRET}"
+	${KEY_MATCH}
+}
 MATCH
     cat >> "${GUARD}" <<GUARDRULE
 respond @bad_token \`{"error":"invalid_token"}\` 403 {